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DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN
HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM
The overall picture about the development of theoretical legal thought in the
Central and Eastern European region with Hungary included is rather paradoxical
indeed. Namely, there has been neither a major breakthrough nor shifts of emphasis
in the past one to two decades. However, the evolution of tendencies perceptible
anyway does indicate the potentiality for a strong impulse that may grow to
changes with milestone significance in the near future.185
(1) International environment. As known, the period between the end of
the Second World War and the turn of the millennium became increasingly
dominated by an analytical approach worldwide – first in the Atlantic world,
then also spreading slowly to Europe.186 Accordingly, Anglo-American ana-
lytical jurisprudence (in tandem with its somewhat parallel European
equivalent) is the direct legacy of the turn of the millennium for our present
day. Therefore, it is no mere chance that for the recent time we can mostly
encounter the immeasurable sprawling of these, by their growing into the only
preferable way of thinking about law. In result of this, impoverishment and
depletion of all the other directions are to follow, exemplifying the aggres-
siveness of any kind of imperialism in this easy victory (that may make us
prey to some kind of a scholarly vogue), indicating some deep uncertainty at
the same time.
Because, despite the general intellectual revival following the Second World
War with the demand to face (by looking back on) law itself as a potential source
of danger – in the course of which, first, revival of the law’s ontological founda-
tions and epistemological properties could be re-formulated with some natural
law perspective in describing its borderlines; then, these ontological and episte-
mological approaches became unified, in order to culminate later on in a clash
between formalism and anti-formalism in the context of law and language, law
and logic, law and rhetoric – well, following the subsequent internal self-
emptying of formalism and exhaustion of anti-formalism,187 all such progress has
suddenly become (in a typically European continental way) relegated to the
185. For the literature in Hungarian, see the version of the present paper in A. Jakab and P. Taka´cs
(eds), A magyar jogrendszer a´talakula´sa 1985/1990 – 2005 (Transformation of the Hungarian
Legal Order 1985/1990–2005), (ELTE A´JK – Gondolat, Budapest, 2007). The recent survey
has been subsidied by the project K62382 (AJP 2005) of the Hungarian Scientific Research
Fund (OTKA).
186. See e.g., E. Pattaro (ed.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer,
Dordrecht, 2005), Volumes I–V, or the immense ongoing undertaking of A. Peczenik (ed.),
IVR Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law: <http://www.
ivr-enc.info/en/index.php>
187. More precisely, after the death of Villey and Perelman without having established proper
schools or institutional continuation, in want of appropriate successors.
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background with striking rapidity, just to yield to that new kind of denaturation
(perhaps at the same time also as a particularly perverse fulfilment) by the advance
of analyticalism.
For it occurred the first time in the European history of ideas that a space,
apparently emptied out by itself, was filled by the direct theoretical influx of an
Anglo-American legal thought. Although, due to the fact that – figuratively
speaking – Michel Villey and Chaı¨m Perelman have been replaced by H.L.A.
Hart and Ronald M. Dworkin in determining the tone of ongoing debates, the
effect of post-Second World War continental natural law and anti-formalism,
limiting and even alleviating the earlier predominance of legal positivism, could
even further intensify, on the one hand. However, this became realized under the
aegis of linguistic analysis alien to the continental legal perspective by its origins,
having also emerged in Anglo-American jurisprudence as a by-product of the
intention at formalizing ethics, and thus, later on, only transferred in a by far not
organic way to the field of law, on the other. Nonetheless, this analytical image of
law, due to its mere artificiality and inner tendency to simulate law in a virtua-
lized manner (instead of actual investigation into the subject matter), required
and also cultivated legal sociology as a specific requisite to legal theory, as an
indispensably auxiliary discipline in the macro- and micro-level research of legal
reality, in which – let us recall here – a worldwide and emphatic co-operation
between continental and Anglo-American legal scholarship could well have
developed since the emergence of legal sociology, that is, for nearly a century
now. Although the analytical study of law has in the meantime (by overestimat-
ing its own potential) gained predominance in most of Western Europe,188 it has
still proven short-lived (at least in its form known until now) in historical
dimensions.
Its striving for exclusivity at the fora of legal theorizing with a profoundly
sterile predominance was met with rejection by those of the professional commu-
nity teaching practical subjects of positive law (as perceivable now in the Nordic
and Western European restriction of legal theoretical and philosophical subjects in
the university curricula, assessable as a compulsive reaction). Meanwhile, the fora
of the theoretical inquiries about law seem to join forces in the hope of some
re-orientation with new beginnings.
In summary, the international reality of the turn of the millennium189 is hardly
more than a cavalcade of basic ethoses and approaches, in which the American
scene is continuing to be dominated by the re-consideration of the feasible contents
and ways of the judicial development of law through principles drawn from the
constitution with human rights ideologies in the background, while the European
188. In which, of course, with basic definitions unchanged, features of the one-sidedness are being
gradually eroded, moreover, with a demand for and also attempt at universality (by metamor-
phizing into a comprehensive general theory) also assessed.
189. Cf., e.g., in a bibliographical elaboration, the series of Current Legal Theory <http://www.
cirfid.unibo.it/cult> or, in the mirror of a series of personal self-reports, L.J. Wintgens (ed.),
The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. My Philosophy of Law (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999).
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stand stresses a pretended harmony of post-modernity, nurturing itself from
the cacophony of manifold ambiguities and vaguenesses.190
(2) The situation in Hungary. By the end of the communist party rule, theoretical
legal thought in Hungary191 had undergone substantial changes: it definitely became
open as it continuously adapted itself to its international environment in a permanent
dialogue less in debate with than in an increasingly creative participation to (and as
an acknowledged part of) it. In all this, in parallel with the total rejection of the
imposed political regime of socialism,192 a kind of continuity and permanence
reasonably could yet prevail, without an expressed break or division. For its
once decisive authors had gradually risen anyway to great old names in the
representation of the past and, thereby, also to antecedents in a sequence of the
historical generation of ideas. Its most creative authors were writing opuses of
synthesis in reconsideration of their established views, surrounded anyway by
international attention; and its mid-generation was to experiment with its own
ways to make it possible for a fresh Euro-Atlantic way of thinking to be cultivated
as well in the domestic medium, especially in the classical fields of legal philos-
ophy, sociological jurisprudence and linguistic-logical reconstruction. Moreover, in
addition to the emergence of works preparing for the future, attempts at re-inte-
grating the past (once spectacularly renounced by the communists’ alleged
revolutionary discontinuity) may have also started.
This way, irrespective of the nature and success of the political change in the
country anyway, there was no need for any spectacular shift in theoretical legal
thought. Even if it may seem alien to scholarship’s self-esteem and sublime intel-
lectuality, let me make the following remark: as a result of the mere fact that
academic publishing had finally become the exclusive matter of financing
190. An especially instructive example is offered by the destiny of Peczenik who could first, as the
President of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR),
build up his own memorial then had to live to see, before his sadly early death, the teaching of
theoretical legal subjects being questioned by all the three faculties in Sweden. For the a propos
of such faculty boards’ re-evaluation was just his speciality on the field, namely, philosophiz-
ing and theorizing on law reduced to the long-term sterility of mere conceptual analysis.
191. Cf., e.g., V. Peschka, ‘Gyula Eo¨rsi: Philosopher of Law’ (2002) 43 Acta Juridica 43, as well as
C. Varga, ‘The Place of Law in Luka´cs’ Ontology’, in L. Ille´s et al (eds), Hungarian Studies on
Gyo¨rgy Luka´cs (Akade´miai Kiado´, Budapest, 1993), Volume II, pp. 563–577; C. Varga, ‘O
espac¸o do direito na ontologia de Luka´cs’ (2003) 18/39 Novos Rumos 4; and C. Varga,
‘Autonomy and Instrumentality of Law in a Superstructural Perspective’ (1999) 40 Acta
Juridica 213.
192. E.g., C. Varga, ‘Liberty, Equality, and the Conceptual Minimum of Legal Mediation’, in
N. MacCormick and Z. Bankowski (eds), Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution. Essays in
Legal and Social Philosophy (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1989), pp. 229–251; as
well as C. Varga, ‘Law as a Social Issue’, in S. Wronkowska and M. Ziełinski (eds), Szkice z
teorii prawa i szczego´lowych nauk prawnych. Professorowi Zygmuntowi Ziembinskiemu
(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznan,
1990), pp. 239–255.
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(freed from administrative constraints and privileged positions characteristic of the
dictatorial regime which used to select according to non-academic merits from the
outset) and due to the statutory re-framing of the status of universities with the first
grades of academic (scientific) qualification relocated under their responsibility,
they could after all become (again) the fundamental workshop for the cultivation of
scholarship, in parallel with the doubling of the number of faculties of law within a
few years. Well, in contrast to the past regime spanning half a century, all this has
offered entirely new and hitherto unknown prospects for both preparing own text-
books and publishing a wide number of papers at the growing fora of
publication.193
Or, new vistas were opened during the last two decades to be overviewed here,
first of all in (a) the publication of own textbooks, lectures and notes varying now
from one alma mater to the next one, with the need also to regularly revise, rewrite
and enlarge them; in (b) the cultivation of scholarship expanding to newer fields,
from among which (1) the investigation into the connections between law and
language and logic and rhetoric could result in the reformulation of earlier results
with an increasingly synthesizing force; (2) the Anglo-American type of concep-
tual analysis (hardly practised in Hungary till then) entered the scene with the
downright claim to found an exclusive school within an unprecedentedly short
period of time; and (3) after an almost complete silencing for more than half a
century, the idea of natural law started to vindicate its own place under the sun
through a series of published historical overviews and monographical papers; in (c)
the key subsidiary and apparently marginal fields, there came (1) a disciplinary re-
start of (A) the classical cultivation of the history of ideas, (B) legal anthropology
gained new force and a somewhat independent form, (C) legal sociology became a
nation-wide movement indeed, while (D) in the field of legal comparativism,
foundational works have been born, and all this – if the projected researches
would in fact start and produce substantial results – (2) might augment the circle
of problems covered by theoretical legal investigation with newer topics, such as
(A) the research into the doctrinal bases of law, (B) the enquiry from the case-
historical and narrative aspect of ‘law and literature’ and, by (C) expressing our
day’s preference to economism and the drive to quantify, the theorizing in terms of
‘law and economics’.
(a) Two major circumstances brought new perspective, internal encourage-
ment and special dynamism into textbook-writing. The first is that in a country of
ten million inhabitants, there are now eight faculties of law offering their own
programmes for quite an extended and deepened teaching in legal theory as a basic
193. Just to give a hint of the abundance unseen till then, it may suffice to refer to the presence of a
journal initiated and edited in chief by B. Pokol – Jogelme´leti Szemle (Review of Legal
Theory), (2000 – ) published electronically <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu>–as well as the series of
books ‘Jogfilozo´fia´k’ in Hungarian and ‘Philosophiae Iuris’ in Western languages, launched
and edited by C. Varga (now in the Institute for Legal Philosophy he founded at the Catholic
University in 1995 which has been awarded – as the first ever had at department level in
Hungary – ‘A Place of Excellence’ by the National Accreditation Committee), and the series
Prudentia iuris launched and edited by M. Szabo´ at the University of Miskolc.
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course.194 The second is that with a new system of academic qualification intro-
duced, most faculties launched doctoral schools which, within the perspective
of Ph.D thesis-writing, may have added – as an extra impulse – the preparation
of teaching aids. Besides summarization and recapitulation in textbooks,195 sophis-
ticatedelaborations ofpartial topicsas well as foundational translations196 and re-edi-
tions have been produced for study purposes either in the compulsory main subject
of legal theory (following propedeutics) or the specialist seminaries attached to it,
as well as in doctoral courses, re-systematizing of or problematizing on legal
theoretical thought, which are expected to superimpose to one another.
(b) Obviously, only just a few major fields can be mentioned to indicate the
transformation of the fields of scholarship cultivated, in addition to the fortunately
growing number of either festschrift volumes of essays in honour of eminent person-
alities or proceedings of conferences held either on anniversaries or in international or
domestic workshops, on the one hand, and to endeavours at laying the foundations,197
194. For a description of courses, see C. Varga ‘The Teaching of Legal Philosophy in Hungary’
(2004) IVR Newsletter No. 33, pp. 23–24: <http://www.ivr2003.net/bologna/newsletters/
33.pdf> It is to be noted that by the academic year starting in 2006, natural law was also
transformed into an obligatory subject, and comparative legal cultures as well as sociology of
the state (political sociology) are classed within optionally obligatory subjects.
195. E.g., B. Pokol, The Concept of Law: The Multi-layered Legal System (Rejtjel, Budapest, 2001);
C. Varga, Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking (Philosophiae Iuris, Akade´miai Kiado´,
Budapest, 1999).
196. E.g., M. Szabo´ (ed.), Bevezete´s a jogbo¨lcseleti gondolkoda´s to¨rte´nete´be (Introduction to the
History of Legal Philosophical Thought), (Miskolci Egyetem Jogelme´leti e´s Jogszociolo´giai
Tansze´k, Miskolc, 1991), for the most part translated from E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981). As the collection of foundational texts in
philosophy of law, see e.g., C. Varga (ed.), A jogi gondolkoda´s paradigma´i Szo¨vegek (Texts to
the Study of the Paradigms of Legal Thinking), (Bibliotheca Cathedrae Philosophiae Iuris et
Rerum Politicarum Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pa´zma´ny nominatae III/2, [ETO Print],
Budapest, 1998) as well as C. Varga (ed.), Jog e´s filozo´fia: Antolo´gia a XX. sza´zad jogi
gondolkoda´sa ko¨re´bo l (Law and Philosophy: Anthology of Legal Theorizing from the First
Half of the 20th Century), (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2001). As a collection of specific
papers, see e.g., M. Bo´dig and M. Szabo´ (eds), Logikai olvaso´ko¨nyv joghallgato´k sza´ma´ra (A
Reader of Logic for Students of Law), (Bı´bor Kiado´, Miskolc, 1996); J. Szabadfalvi (ed.), Mai
angol-amerikai jogelme´leti to¨rekve´sek (Current Anglo-American Trends in Legal Philosophy),
(Bı´bor Kiado´, Miskolc, 1996); C. Varga (ed.), Comparative Legal Cultures (Dartmouth, Alder-
shot - New York University Press, New York, 1992) and translated in a new, enlarged com-
position in C. Varga (ed.), O¨sszehasonlı´to´ jogi kultu´ra´k (Osiris, Budapest, 2000); B. Fekete
(ed.), A jogo¨sszehasonlı´ta´s elme´lete: Szo¨vegek a jelenkori komparatisztika ko¨re´bo l (The The-
ory of Comparative Law: Texts from Contemporary Legal Comparativism), (Szent Istva´n
Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2006). As an author-focussed translation, see e.g., J. Hervada, Introduc-
cio´n crı´tica al derecho natural (EUNSA, Pamplona, 1993) available by K. Ha´rsfai (trans.),
Kritikai bevezete´s a terme´szetjogba (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2004).
197. E.g., on the one hand: B. Pokol, Komplexe Gesellschaft: Eine der mo¨glichen Luhmannschen
Soziologien (Mobilita¨t und Normenwandel Volume 8) (Brockmeyer, Bochum, 1990), B. Pokol,
Complex Society: One of the Possible Luhmannite Theories of Sociology (Co-ordination Office
for Higher Education, Budapest, 1991); B. Pokol, ‘Law as a System of Professional Institu-
tions’ (1993) 8/2 Connecticut Journal of International Law 507; and B. Pokol, ‘Law as a
Professional System of Institutions’ (1990) 21 Rechtstheorie 272; as well as, on the other
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clarifying key problems,198 collecting authors’ own papers,199 on the other. Let me
highlight some of them below.
(i) Investigation relating to law and language,200 law and logic201 as well as
rhetoric, seems to occupy a special place from the outset. Namely, no matter how
hand: P. Cserne, ‘From Law to Social Science and Back Again – the First Step: Remarks on the
Juristic Origin of Some Weberian Concepts’, in I. H. Szila´gyi and M. Paksy (eds), Ius unum, lex
multiplex: Liber Amicorum: Studia Z. Pe´teri dedicata (Studies in Comparative Law, Theory of
State and Legal Philosophy), (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2005), pp. 457–472; A. Ka-
ra´csony, ‘Gesellschaftstheorie und Recht’ (1998) 37 Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Buda-
pestinensis de Rolando Eo¨tvo¨s nominatae: Sectio Juridica 27.
198. E.g., I. Balogh, ‘Begru¨ndungsprobleme der Gerechtigkeitstheorie’ (2006) 92 Archiv fu¨r
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 28; T. Fo¨ldesi, ‘Civil Disobedience: The ‘‘Step-brother’’ of
Civil Rights’ Annales 32 (1991), 21–37. Taka´cs, ‘Begriff des Gemeinwohls’ in (2002) 41/
42 Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eo¨tvo¨s nominatae: Sectio
Juridica 177; A. Tama´s, ‘The Law as a Command in the Pure Theory of Law and Technical
Theory of Jurisprudence’, in K. To´th (ed.), Emle´kko¨nyv Antalffy Gyo¨rgy egyetemi tana´r oktato´i
muko¨de´se´nek 40. e´s szu¨lete´se´nek 70. e´vfordulo´ja´ra (Festschrift for Professor Gyo¨rgy Antalf-
fy’s 40th Anniversary of Teaching and 70th Birthday), (Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de
Attila Jo´zsef nominatae, Szeged, 1990), pp. 225–239; A. Tama´s, ‘The Law as a Modernization
Technique’ (1990) 31 Acta Juridica 263; A. Tama´s, ‘The Technical Element in Law’ (1990) 5
Publ. Univ. Miskolc: Sectio juridica et politica 81; A. Tama´s, ‘Regulation by Law and
Regulation by Government in the Rule of Law and the Technical Theory of Jurisprudence’,
in K. To´th (ed.), Kova´cs Istva´n-emle´kko¨nyv (Festschrift Istva´n Kova´cs) (Szeged, 1991), pp.
383–396; A. Tama´s, ‘Law Making and Administration’, in G. Ba´ndi (ed.), U¨nnepi ko¨tet Boytha
Gyo¨rgyne´ tisztelete´re (Festschrift) (Pa´zma´ny Pe´ter Katolikus Egyetem Jog- e´s A´llamtudoma´-
nyi Kar, Budapest, 2002), pp. 108–114; C. Varga, Codification as a Socio-historical Phenom-
enon (Akade´miai Kiado´, Budapest, 1991); as well as C. Varga, ‘La Codification a` l’aube du
troisie`me mille´naire’, in G. Cohen-Jonathan et al (eds), Me´langes Paul Amselek (Bruylant,
Bruxelles, 2004), pp. 779–800; C. Varga, ‘Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millen-
nium’ (2006) 47 Acta Juridica 89; C. Varga, ‘The Basic Settings of Modern Formal Law’, in
V. Gessner, A. Hoeland and C. Varga (eds), European Legal Cultures (Dartmouth, Aldershot,
1996), pp. 89–103; C. Varga, ‘Central and Eastern European Philosophy of Law’, ‘Codifica-
tion’, ‘Ex Post Facto Legislation’, ‘History (Historicity) of Law’, ‘Legal Ontology (Metaphys-
ics)’ and ‘Validity’, all in C.B. Gray (ed.), The Philosophy of Law. An Encyclopedia (Garland
Publishing, New York/London, 1999), pp. 98–100, 120–122, 274–276, 371–373, 617–619, and
883–885, respectively; and K. Kulcsa´r ‘Politics and Legal Policy’, in P. Koller, C. Varga and
O. Weinberger (eds), Theoretische Grundlagen der Rechtspolitik. Ungarisch – o¨sterrei-
chisches Symposium der Internationalen Vereinigung fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
1990 (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, 1992), pp. 17–27; M. Samu, ‘Legal Policy
and Its Axiological Background’, in Koller, Varga and Weinberger (eds), pp. 95–102; and
P. Szila´gyi, ‘Zur theoretischen Grundlegung der Rechtspolitik der Gesetzgebung’, in Koller,
Varga and Weinberger (eds), pp. 104–109.
199. E.g., C. Varga, Law and Philosophy. Selected Papers in Legal Theory (Philosophiae Iuris,
Budapest, 1994).
200. C. Varga, Theory of the Judicial Process: The Establishment of Facts (Akade´miai Kiado´,
Budapest, 1995) – with preliminary inquiries such as C. Varga, ‘Judicial Reproduction of
the Law in an Autopoietical System?’ (1991) 11 Rechtstheorie 305 and (1990) 32 Acta Juridica
144; C. Varga, ‘Institutions As Systems: An Essay on the Closed Nature, Open Vistas of
Development, As Well As the Transparency of the Institutions and Their Conceptual Repre-
sentations’ (1991) 33 Acta Juridica 167; C. Varga, ‘An Investigation into the Nature of the
Judicial Process’ <http://www.univie.ac.at/RI/IRIS2006/papers/varga.pdf> Then, with
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pioneering a role it once used to play from the end of the 1960s in the theoretical
loosening of the positions of classical positivism (or, in Hungary, of socialist
normativism), including their transcendence by developing new paradigms,202
today it still represents the memory of some connection to the European past
because, even if detached by its framework of interpretation, it can still be corre-
lated to the law’s one-time comprehension by ontologies and epistemologies while,
preliminarily published papers, such as C. Varga, ‘Changing of Paradigms in the
Understanding of Judicial Process’, in W. Krawietz, M. Samu and P. Szila´gyi (eds), Sonderheft
Ungarn: Verfassungsstaat, Stabilita¨t und Variabilita¨t des Rechts im modernen Rechtssystem,
Internationales Symposium der Budapester Juristischen Fakulta¨t (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin,
1995), pp. 415–424; C. Varga, ‘The Judicial Process: A Contribution to Its Philosophical
Understanding’ (1994) 36 Acta Juridica 145, and (1998) 69 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie Beiheft 206; C. Varga, ‘The Mental Transformation of Facts into a Case’ (1991) 77
Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 59; C. Varga, ‘The Non-cognitive Character of the
Judicial Establishment of Facts’ (1990) 32 Acta Juridica 247, and (1994) 53 Archiv fu¨r Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 230; C. Varga, ‘Descriptivity, Normativity, and Ascriptivity: A
Contribution to the Subsumption/Subordination Debate’ (1992) 54 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 162; C. Varga, ‘The Judicial Establishment of Facts and Its Proce-
durality’, in W. Krawietz and J. Wro´blewski (eds), Sprache, Performanz und Ontologie des
Rechts. Festgabe fu¨r Kazimierz Opalek zum 75. Geburtstag (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin,
1993), pp. 245–258; C. Varga, ‘On Judicial Ascertainment of Facts’ (1991) 4 Ratio Juris
61; C. Varga, ‘La nature de l’e´tablissement judiciaire des faits’ (1996) 40 Archives de Philo-
sophie du Droit 396; and C. Varga, ‘What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over?
Debates Revolving around the Topic of ‘‘The Judicial Establishment of Facts’’’, in M. Atienza
et al. (eds), Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift fu¨r Werner Krawietz zum 70.
Geburtstag (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2003), pp. 657–676.
201. M. Szabo´, ‘Law as Translation’ (2004) 91 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 60;
and M. Szabo´, ‘Practical Equivalence’ (2005) 97 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
Beiheft 187; C. Varga, ‘The Context of the Judicial Application of Norms’, in W. Krawietz
et al. (eds), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems.
Festschrift for Robert S. Summers (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994), pp. 495–512;
C. Varga, ‘No Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere?’ (1995) 60 Archiv fu¨r Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 31; C. Varga, ‘Law, Language and Logic: Expectations and
Actual Limitations of Logic in Legal Reasoning’, in C. Ciampi et al. (eds), Verso un sistema
esperto giuridico integrale (Cedam, Padova, 1995), Volume I, pp. 665–679; as well as
C. Varga, ‘Legal Logic and the Internal Contradiction of Law’, in E. Schweighofer et al.
(eds), Informationstechnik in der juristischen Realita¨t. Aktuelle Fragen zur Rechtsinformatik
2004 (Verlag O¨sterreich, Wien, 2004), pp. 49–56; and C. Varga, ‘Rule and/or Norm, or the
Conceptualisibility and Logifiability of Law’, in E. Schweighofer et al. (eds), Effizienz von
e-Lo¨sungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik (Tagungsband
der 8. Internationalen Rechtsinformatik Symposions, IRIS 2005) (Boorberg, Stuttgart, 2005),
pp. 58–65.
202. C. Varga, ‘ ‘‘Law’’, or ‘‘More or Less Legal’’?’ (1992) 34 Acta Juridica 139, as well as
C. Varga, ‘Norms through Parables in the New Testament: An Alternative Framework for
Time and Law’, in F. Ost and M. Van Hoecke (eds), Time and Law. Is it the Nature of Law to
Last? (Bibliothe`que de l’Acade´mie Europe´enne de The´orie du Droit, Bruylant, Bruxelles,
1998), pp. 213–224; C. Varga, ‘Measuring through Patterning in Law: Development of an
Idea in Europe’ (1998) 39 Acta Juridica 107; C. Varga, ‘Patterns of Thought, Patterns of Law’
(1997) 38 Acta Juridica 93; C. Varga, ‘Paradigms of Legal Thinking’ (1999) 40 Acta Juridica
19; and C. Varga, ‘The Nature of Law and Legal Thinking’, in P. Mares and J.-P. Clero (eds),
La notion de justice aujourd’hui (Valahia University Press, Taˆrgovis¸te, 2005), pp. 112–124.
638 Csaba Varga
perhaps up to the present day, it is the most powerful trend that has proved most
effective in describing the whys and hows of the law’s actual construction and
operation by looking behind the law’s ideologically postulated formal construction
and operation, in order to reconstruct their genuine components.
(ii) The analytical trend in legal scholarship – borrowed from the Anglo-
American mainstream with presuppositions characteristic of a definite political
philosophical viewpoint and cultivated mostly in frameworking interpretations,
whose Hungarian reception has practically no reflection to either its continental
parallels or to its further developed variants (continental or realized elsewhere) –
has obviously arrived from outside, with proper claims, approach, methodology,
sources, and conceptual world. However – as this became clear in, e.g., Poland, in
competition with Marxism nearly for three decades now – this analytical trend not
only had a fermenting effect but was also able to challenge the typically continental
patterns of thought accustomed in Hungary by raising new questions. With this, it
can reach (if it has not already reached) not only its conceptual world and to some
extent also its underlying political and philosophical worldview being adapted but
also becoming itself the natural subject of legal discourses.203
(iii) Together with all the ‘bourgeois’ legacies cultivated as legal philosophy
mostly along new-Kantian methodological confines between the two World Wars
in Hungary, it was natural law that suffered the greatest losses of the Muscovite-
style of ideological homogenization in Hungary, stricken, in addition to being
silenced, by another circumstance as well, notably, that natural law as such hardly
existed for almost one whole century in Hungary, because even its earlier culti-
vation, both in the pre-war and inter-war periods, was done rather theologically
than as an organic part of legal philosophizing. All that notwithstanding, today it
occupies an in-between position, because both in general and in its having covered
by lawyers, it is part of the international catholic intellectual revival and also of a
reconsideration of basic issues demanded by the age. At the same time it is also
activated both as the ever-green historical counter-pole to legal positivism (under
general criticism and attack now)204 and as the literally ultimate promise of offer-
ing some axiological foundation and point of reference, suitable to define (upon its
tradition lived through millennia) reliable criteria so wanted for our world having
lost its direction and being endangered from several sides.
(c) On the auxiliary and marginal areas, (A) history of ideas was so to speak
never regularly cultivated in a classical sense earlier in Hungary. Our related scanty
literary outputs, starting from, say, the end of the 19th century, is scarcely more
than a set of occasional digressions, anniversary commemorations or prefaces.
In contrast, what is about to come to fruition at present (and perhaps in the
hope of a better future) already now shows the signs of a certain abundance.
203. E.g., M. Bo´dig, ‘The Political Character of Legal Institutions and Its Conceptual Significance’
(2005) 46 Acta Juridica 33.
204. E.g., F. Ho¨rcher, Philosophiae Iuris. Towards a Pragmatic Theory of Natural Law (Akade´miai
Kiado´, Budapest, 2000); and S. Tattay, ‘Are Legal Semiotics and Natural Law Irreconcil-
able?’, in Mares and Clero (eds), above, pp. 101–110.
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Namely, researchers have started becoming specialized in studying certain histor-
ical trends and schools from antiquity205 to the early modern206 and modern age,207
in addition to reconsidering contemporary development – mostly through
Western208 and Central and Eastern European209 or domestic210 antecedents – ,
205. E.g., A. Fo¨ldi, ‘Zum Begriffsgeschichte der Verantwortung’, in H. Szila´gyi and Paksy (eds),
above, pp. 89–116; T. No´ta´ri, ‘Summum ius summa iniuria: Comments on the Historical
Background of a Legal Maxim of Interpretation’ (2004) 45 Acta Juridica 301; T. No´ta´ri,
‘On Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority’ (2005) 46 Acta Juridica 95; T. No´ta´ri,
‘The Scales as the Symbol of Justice in the Iliad’ (2005) 46 Acta Juridica 249; M. Szabo´,
‘Formal Justice and Positive Law: The Graeco-Roman Heritage’, in O. Pe´ter and B. Szabo´
(eds), Bona discere. Festgabe fu¨r Ja´nos Zlinszky zum 70. Geburtstag (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 1998),
pp. 253–267.
206. E.g., S. Tattay, ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights in Ockham’s Legal Philosophy’, in
H. Szila´gyi and Paksy (eds), above, pp. 539–555.
207. E.g., A. Kara´csony, ‘Legal Hermeneutics in German Jurisprudence since the Early 17th Cen-
tury’ (2004) 44 Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eo¨tvo¨s nomi-
natae: Sectio Juridica 189.
208. In a classical sense, M. Bo´dig, ‘Hart’s Jurisprudence: Its Relation to Philosophy’ (2001) 42
Acta Juridica 1–23 pp.; C. Varga, ‘Hans Kelsens Rechtsanwendungslehre: Entwicklung,
Mehrdeutigkeiten, offene Probleme, Perspektiven’ (1990) 76 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie 348–366; C. Varga, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of Law-application: Evolution, Ambigu-
ities, Open Questions’ (1994) 36 Acta Juridica 3–27 pp.; C. Varga, ‘Change of Paradigms in
Legal Reconstruction (Carl Schmitt and the Temptation to Finally Reach a Synthesis)’, in P.
Wahlgren (ed.), Perspectives on Jurisprudence. Essays in Honor of Jes Bjarup (Scandinavian
Studies in Law, Volume 48, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, Stockholm, 2005), pp.
517–529; and C. Varga, ‘The Hart-phenomenon’ (2005) 91 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphi-
losophie 83–95 pp.; as a contemporary overview A. Visegra´dy, ‘Legal Theories at the Turn of
the Third Millennium’, in G. Andra´ssy and A. Visegra´dy (eds), Ko¨zjogi inte´zme´nyek a XXI.
Sza´zadban. Jog e´s joga´szok a XXI. sza´zad ku¨szo¨be´n (Institutions of public law in the 21st
century: Law and lawyers at the threshold of the 21st century), (Pe´csi Tudoma´nyegyetem
A´llam- e´s Jogtudoma´nyi Kara, Pe´cs, 2004), pp. 43–52; G. Monori, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence
in the 21st Century’, in Andra´ssy and Visegra´dy (eds), ibid, pp. 55–68.
209. C. Varga, ‘Philosophy of Law in Central and Eastern Europe: A Sketch of History’ (2000) 41
Acta Juridica 17.
210. E.g., P. Szila´gyi, ‘Die Anfa¨nge der ungarischen Rechtsphilosophie’ (2003) 43 Annales Univer-
sitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eo¨tvo¨s nominatae: Sectio Juridica 21; J. Sza-
badfalvi, ‘Short History of Legal Philosophical Thinking in Hungary until the Mid-Twentieth
Century’ (2004) 25 Acta Iuridica Cassoviensia 36; J. Szabadfalvi, ‘Revaluation of Hungarian
Legal Philosophical Tradition’ (2003) 89 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 159;
J. Szabadfalvi, ‘The Role of the Hungarian Legal Philosophical Tradition in the Renewal of
National Legal Culture’, in J. Cipkar (ed.), Law Culture and European Integration Process
(Pra´vnicka´ fakulta UPJSˇ, Kosˇice, 2004), pp. 236–248; J. Szabadfalvi, ‘Transition and Tradition:
Can Hungarian Traditions of Legal Philosophy Contribute to Legal Transition?’, in W. Krawietz
and C. Varga (eds), On Different Legal Cultures, Pre-Modern and Modern States, and the
Transition to the Rule of Law in Western and Eastern Europe (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin,
2003), pp. 167–185; J. Szabadfalvi, ‘Portrait-sketches from the History of Hungarian Neo-
Kantian Legal Philosophical Thought’ (2003) 44 Acta Juridica 245; J. Szabadfalvi, ‘Wesen
und Problematik der Rechtsphilosophie: Die Rechtsphilosophie von Gyula Moo´r’ (1998) 15
Publ. Univ. Miskolc: Sectio juridica et politica 209; J. Szabadfalvi, ‘Some Reflections on the
Anglo-Saxon Influence in the Legal Philosophical Traditions’ (2001) 42 Acta Juridica 111; and
J. Szabadfalvi, ‘The Spirit of the Common Law in the Hungarian Legal Philosophical Thinking’
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including both reprints (at times enlarged into collections)211 and
translations,212 moreover, at times also original texts editions.213 In laying social
theoretical foundations for legal philosophical thought, a key role may be played
(2003) 9 Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies 199; C. Varga ‘Philosophising on
Law in the Turmoil of Communist Take-over in Hungary (Two Portraits, Interwar and Post-war)’
(on Moo´r and Losonczy), in M. Leszkiewicz (ed.), 2005 ALPSA Annual Publication (Brisbane,
2005), pp. 82–94; A´. Zsidai, ‘Die Erscheinung der Perspektive: Synoptische Rechtstheorie von
Horva´th Barna’ (2004) 44 Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eo¨t-
vo¨s nominatae: Sectio Juridica 207; A. Kara´csony, ‘In the Attraction of Natural Right: Bibo´
Istva´n’s Conception of Law’ (2002) 41/42 Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de
Rolando Eo¨tvo¨s nominatae: Sectio Juridica 223
211. For re-editing pieces of international literature, see H. Kelsen, Az a´llamelme´let alapvonalai
(Grundrib einer allgemeinen Theorie des Staates, 1926), G. Moo´r (trans.), J. Szabadfalvi (ed.)
(Bı´bor Kiado´, Miskolc, 1997); and C. Varga (ed.), Marxian Legal Theory (Dartmouth, Alder-
shot – New York University Press, New York, 1993); for re-editing from the domestic legacy
(in a chronological order of sources): F. Somlo´, Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie, C. Varga (ed.)
(Akade´miai Kiado´, Budapest, 1999); J. Moo´r Rechtsphilosophische Aufsa¨tze, C. Varga (ed.)
(Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2006); B. Horva´th, Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie: Volume I,
Prozessuelle Rechtslehre (1926–1948); Volume II, Gerechtigkeitslehre (1926–1948); Volume
III, Papers in Emigration (1949–1971) – C. Varga (ed.) (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest,
2007) (in preparation); C. Varga (ed.), Die Schule von Szeged. Rechtsphilosophische Aufsa¨tze
von Istva´n Bibo´, Jo´zsef Szabo´ und Tibor Vas (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2006).
212. As dedicated to trends and schools and topics, e.g., J. Szabadfalvi (ed.), Historical Juris-
prudence (Osiris, Budapest, 2000); A. Visegra´dy (ed.), Scandinavian Legal Realism (Szent
Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2003); J. Frivaldszky (ed.), Terme´szetjog. Szo¨veggyujteme´ny
(Natural law texts) (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2004); M. Szabo´ and C. Varga (eds),
Jog e´s nyelv (Law and Language), (Jogfilozo´fia´k, Budapest, 2000); I. H. Szila´gyi (ed.), Jog e´s
antropolo´gia (Law and Anthropology), (Osiris, Budapest, 2000); P. Taka´cs (ed.), Joguralom
e´s joga´llam (Rule of Law and Rechtsstaatlichkeit), (Osiris, Budapest, 1995); P. Paczolay
(ed.), Alkotma´nybı´ra´skoda´s – alkotma´nye´rtelmeze´s (Constitutional Adjudication –
Constitutional Interpretation), (Osiris, Budapest, 1995); in personal oeuvres, St Th. Aquinas,
A terme´szetjogro´l (On Natural Law), C. Varga (ed.) (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2007)
(in preparation); J. Frank, A bı´ra´skoda´s az e´rtelem ı´te´lo sze´ke elo tt. Va´logatott ı´ra´sok (Select-
ed Texts on Courts and Trial), A. Bado´ (ed.) (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2006); H.
Coing, Grundzu¨ge der Rechtsphilosophie (1993) B. Szabo´ (trans.), A jogfilozo´fia alapjai
(Osiris, Budapest, 1996); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994) P. Taka´cs (trans.), A
jog fogalma (Osiris, Budapest, 1995); F. Horkay Ho¨rcher (ed.), Hayek e´s a brit felvila´go-
soda´s. Tanulma´nyok a konstruktivista gondolkoda´s kritika´ja´nak eszmeto¨rte´neti forra´sairo´l
(Hayek and the British Enlightenment: Historical Sources on the Criticism of Constructi-
vism), (Jogfilozo´fia´k, Budapest, 2002); L. Cs. Kiss and A. Kara´csony, A ta´rsadalom e´s a jog
autopoietikus fele´pı´tettse´ge. Va´logata´s a jogi konstruktivizmus irodalma´bo´l (The Autopoie-
tical Construction of Society and Law: From the Literature of Legal Constructivism), (Osiris,
Budapest, 1994), as well as D. Ne´medi (ed.), Va´logata´s Niklas Luhmann ı´ra´saibo´l (Luhmann
selected), (Szociolo´giai fu¨zetek, Muvelo de´si Miniszte´rium Marxizmus–leninizmus Oktata´si
Fo oszta´lya, Budapest, 1987); and J. Bango´ and A. Kara´csony (eds), Luhmann-ko¨nyv (Luh-
mann-book), (Rejtjel, Budapest, 2002) 253; Z. Grocholewski, La filosofia del diritto di
Giovanni Paolo II (1991) P. Szabo´ (trans.), II. Ja´nos Pa´l jogfilozo´fia´ja (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat,
Budapest, 2003).
213. E.g., H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1934), I. Bibo´ (trans.) (1937) and C. Varga (ed.), Tiszta
jogtan (Jogfilozo´fia´k, Eo¨tvo¨s Lora´nd Tudoma´nyegyetem Bibo´ Istva´n Szakkolle´gium, Buda-
pest, 1988. Repr. Rejtjel, Budapest, 2001); C. Varga (ed.), Aus dem Nachlab von Julius Moo´r
(Philosophiae Iuris, ELTE ‘Comparative Legal Cultures’ Project, Budapest, 1995); and
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by (B) anthropology and (C) sociology. As to legal anthropology, the very start of
its cultivation is remarkable itself.214 On the other hand, legal sociology is refound-
ing itself to become an independent discipline by elaborating monographs215 and
papers216 in addition to textbooks and the launching of its own periodical.217
However, it is still far from that flourishing which proved to be an effective
force forming society at the time of socialism through both theoretical (macro-
sociological) and concrete-empirical (micro-sociological) investigations. Lastly,
(D) legal comparativism is scarcely more today than a respectable subject to
C. Varga, ‘Documents de Kelsen en Hongrie: Hans Kelsen et Julius Moo´r’ (1987) 7 Droit et
Socie´te´ 337; B. Horva´th, The Bases of Law (1948), C. Varga (ed.) (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat,
Budapest, 2006); I. Losonczy, Abrib eines realistischen rechtsphilosophischen Systems,
C. Varga (ed.) (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2002).
214. E.g., I. H. Szila´gyi, ‘Let Us Invent Hungarian Legal Anthropology’, in Krawietz and
Varga (eds), above, pp. 187–196; and I. H. Szila´gyi, ‘The Roma Way – Comparative
Legal Studies: Comparative Law, Sociology and Anthropology’, in H. Szila´gyi and Paksy
(eds), above, pp. 129–148, as well as I. H. Szila´gyi and S. Loss, ‘Opening Scissors: The
Legal Status of the Gypsy Minority in Nowadays Hungary’, in Krawietz and Varga (eds),
ibid. pp. 483–494.
215. First of all, K. Kulcsa´r, Modernisation and Law (Akade´miai Kiado´, Budapest, 1992) p. 282.
216. E.g., A. Bado´, J. Bo´ka and Z. Nagy, Hungarian Lawyers in the Making. Selection Distortions
after the Democratic Changes in Hungary (Acta Universitatis Szegediensis: Acta juridica et
politica 63/1, Szeged, 2003); A. Sajo´, ‘Subjektive Rechte im Bewusstssein der Ungarn’ (1990)
Zeitschrift fu¨r Rechtssoziologie, pp. 91–100; A. Sajo´, ‘Social Change and/or Legal Change’,
in V. Ferrari (ed.), Laws and Rights (Giuffre`, Milano, 1991), pp. 935–953; A. Sajo´, ‘The Role
of Legal Profession in Social Change in Hungary’, in K. Rokumoto (ed.) The Social Role of the
Legal Profession (International Centre for Comparative Law and Politics, Tokyo, 1993), pp.
141–150; and A. Sajo´, ‘Contemporary Problems of the Judiciary in Hungary’, in Rokumoto
(ed.), ibid. pp. 131–139; A. Sajo´, ‘The Role of Lawyers in Social Change (Hungary)’ (1993) 25
International Law 137; and A. Sajo´, ‘L’industrie d’E´tat du changement et l’effort stabilisateur
du droit’, in R. Lukic (ed.), La modernization du droit (Acade´mie Serbe des Sciences et des
Arts: Colloques scientifiques LII: Classe des Sciences sociales 11, Beograd, 1990), pp. 33–49;
C. Varga, ‘The Law and Its Limits’ (1992) 34 Acta Juridica 56; A. Visegra´dy, ‘Die Probleme
der Effektivita¨t des Rechts’, in L. Korinek (ed.), Tanulma´nyok Fo¨ldva´ri Jo´zsef tisztelete´re
(Festschrift Jo´zsef Fo¨ldva´ri) (PTE, Pe´cs, 1996), pp. 170–179; A. Visegra´dy, ‘Zur Effektivita¨t
des Rechts’ (2002) 82 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 51; A. Visegra´dy,
‘Measurement of the Effectiveness of Legal Rules’, in G. Hamza et al. (eds), Iura antiqua –
iura moderna. Festschrift fu¨r Ferenc Benedek zum 75. Geburtstag (Pe´csi Tudoma´nyegyetem
A´llam- e´s Jogtudoma´nyi Kar and Dialo´g Campus, Pe´cs, 2001), pp. 265–275; A. Visegra´dy,
‘Judicial Practice as an Element of Legal Development’, in Krawietz, Samu and Szila´gyi (eds),
above, pp. 425–432; A. Visegra´dy, ‘Rule of Law and Efficiency of the Legal System’, in
Krawietz and Varga (eds), above, pp. 331–340; ‘Legal Cultures and Effectiveness of Law’ in
(2003) 21 Publ. Univ. Miskolc: Sectio juridica et politica 301; A. Visegra´dy, ‘Legislation and
Jurisprudence’, in N. Chronowski (ed.), A´da´m Antal-jubileum (Festschrift Antal A´da´m) (PTE,
Pe´cs, 2005), pp. 211–218; A. Visegra´dy and I. Kajta´r, ‘Rechtstheoretische und rechtshistor-
ische Erla¨uterungen zur Effektivita¨t des Rechts’ (1990) 31 Acta Juridica 293, and A. Visegra´dy
and M. Schadt, ‘The Development of Legal Knowledge of University Students’, in T. Miha´ly
and C. Herke (eds), Tanulma´nyok dr. Fo¨ldva´ri Jo´zsef professzor 75. szu¨lete´snapja tisztelete´re
(Festschrift Jo´zsef Fo¨ldva´ri) (PTE, Pe´cs, 2001), pp. 117–127.
217. E.g., the annually published Kontroll (2003 – ) with rotating university backgrounds and chairs
to edit it.
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teach,218 which (despite partial analyses on the field219) is still waiting for being
recapitulated in textbooks and for a re-start of preparing for monographs (as widely
done in the socialist past as acknowledged internationally) by academic encour-
agement. Nevertheless, it is now widely recognized that comparativism is simply
an old-new sine qua non and, after proper university fora will have been formed, its
cultivation shall also become regular. As a result of all this, (b) research may
fortunately expand to further areas which (A) at last attempt to lay foundations
for the doctrinal study of law,220 (B) realize interdisciplinarity between living law
and philosophical jurisprudence within the (American-type) informality of ‘law
and literature’ (having by now also penetrated Europe), or (C) try to find more
guarantee for plannability and foreseeability in the intermediate sphere of ‘law and
economy’221 (just as once legal behaviourism hoped to realize the indexation of
foreseeability through the statistics of judicial behaviour).
From among all these directions with re-starts and attempts, mutual influ-
ences and intertwinings, it is the repeated debate on law taken as language and
logic (in a continuous struggle with the tradition of legal positivism) that comes
218. Cf., e.g., Z. Pe´teri, ‘Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching’ (2002) 43
Acta Juridica 243.
219. B. Fekete, ‘Legal Assistance and the Transplant of Constitutional Models: A Hungarian Case-
study from the Early Socialist Era’, in M. Sadakata (ed.), Hungary’s Legal Assistance Experi-
ences in the Age of Globalization (Nagoya University Graduate School of Law Center for
Asian Legal Exchange, Nagoya, 2006), pp. 235–248; A. Harmathy, ‘Comparative Law and
Changes of the Law’ (1999) 40 Acta Juridica 159; Z. Pe´teri, ‘La modernization et le droit
socialiste hongrois’, in Lukic (ed.), above, pp. 25–32; Z. Pe´teri, ‘Law and the Legal Families of
the World: The Problem of Classification’, in Sadakata (ed.), ibid. pp. 113–123; and Z. Pe´teri,
‘Law Teaching as a Form of Legal Assistance’, in Sadakata (ed.), ibid. pp. 275–285; B. Pokol,
‘Forms of Judicial Power’, in Nagy La´szlo´-jubileum (La´szlo´ Nagy Festschrift), (SZTE, Szeged,
2004), pp. 351–384; B. Pokol, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Precedent in Hungary’ (2000)
Osteuropa-Recht, 262; B. Pokol, ‘Rechtsauslegung und Pra¨judizienrecht in Ungarn’ 2000/4
Zeitschrift fu¨r o¨ffentliches Recht 87; C. Varga, ‘Meeting Points between the Traditions of
English-American Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law (Developments and
Experience of Postmodernity in Canada)’ (2003) 44 Acta Juridica 21.
220. E.g., M. Paksy, ‘Quelques re´flexions sur la jurisprudence relative a` l’article 4 du Code civil
franc¸ais’, in Mares and Clero (eds), above, pp. 75–85; and M. Paksy, ‘Conservatisme juridi-
que? Essai sur la critique positiviste et antipositiviste de la me´thode ‘ge´ne´tique’ de l’inter-
pre´tation’, in H. Szila´gyi and Paksy (eds), above, pp. 475–498; V. Peschka, ‘The Retroactive
Validity of Legal Norms’ 40 (1999) Acta Juridica 1; B. Pokol, ‘The Structure of Legal System’
(2002) 43 Acta Juridica 219; C. Varga, ‘Validity’ (2000) 41 Acta Juridica 155; A. Ra´cz, ‘The
Binding Force of Legal Rules: Their Validity, Effectiveness, and Applicability’ (1995–1996)
37 Acta Juridica 37.
221. E.g., P. Cserne, ‘The Normativity of Law in Law and Economics’ (2004) German Working
Papers in Law and Economics No. 35: <http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2004/iss1/
art35>; A. Sajo´, ‘Diffuse Rights in Search of an Agent’ (1990) International Review of Law
and Economics 41; A. Sajo´, ‘Marxism and Rights in the Economy’, in L. Swindler (ed.),
Human Rights (Paregon House, New York, 1991), pp. 232–246; A. Sajo´, ‘Law and Economics
in Hungary’, in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
(Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000), Volume I, pp. 240–243; A. Sajo´ and P. Behrens, ‘Die o¨kono-
mischen Grundlagen des Rechts: Politische O¨konomie als rationale Jurisprudenz’ (1989)
75 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 258.
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out as the most innovative in effects, as it resulted (nearly one and a half
decades ago) in recognizing law first as a process, then (searching for the
societal embedding of processes) as a culture, having generated by today the
law’s investigation in a deeper medium, in the historico-comparative examina-
tion of legal cultures themselves. That is, the rejection of positivism’s tight-
fistedness and the relevant studies in classical legal comparativism (attempting
at some self-transcendence) could after all establish a new interest, namely, the
investigation within the perspective of comparative legal cultures, already
involving (as both a promise and as a perspective) the aspiration for comparative
judicial mind, that is, the comparison of how justices arrive at judicial conclu-
sion in different cultures with differing ideas on which ways law and order is to
be standardized and reached.
(3) Outlook I: The historical-comparative study of legal cultures and of the
lawyerly way of thinking. The comparative study222 (assuming also historical expli-
cation) of legal cultures223 may even reverse the order accepted so far in the culti-
vation of universal jurisprudence. Because it can be justifiably proposed that at the
intersection of legal history, legal theory, legal anthropology and comparative law, it
is individual legal cultures (i.e., sets of traditions organized – despite their specific
and growing interactions – into autochtonous blocs) that need to be characterized
first, so that the formalistic envelope usually examined by comparative law, that is,
the positivated institutional superstructure, can be built in these.
The actual novelty in all this is the recognition of the presence of paradigms
perceivable locally in a given time and space, that is, the presumption that in
principle every viable culture generates (or may generate) some kind of geniosity
mostly characteristic of it alone, with kinds of technical procedure promising very
much potentially and also performing much in fact, which guarantees (systemat-
ically and with the required particular balance) both the synchrony and the opti-
mally achievable success of preservation and renewal at any time. That is, the once
usual extensive (quasi-questionary) description reduced normally to the mere list-
ing (in a catalogue-like manner) of data, as some specific legal mapping, can and
shall be replaced by a characterization aiming at highlighting the specificities and
the potentially fertilizing force of la mentalite´ juridique224 developed in a given
222. E.g., C. Varga (ed.), Comparative Legal Cultures (Dartmouth, Aldershot - New York Univer-
sity Press, New York, 1992); Gessner, Hoeland and Varga (eds), above; followed by C. Varga,
‘Comment to the Notion of Legal Culture’, in J. Feest and E. Blankenburg (eds), Changing
Legal Cultures (On˜ati Pre-publications – 2, International Institute for the Sociology of Law,
On˜ati, 1997), pp. 207–217; C. Varga, ‘Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at Conceptua-
lization’ (1997) 38 Acta Juridica 53; C. Varga, ‘Varieties of Law and the Rule of Law’ (1996)
82 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 61.
223. As preliminary studies, see e.g., K. Kulcsa´r, ‘Political Culture – Legal Culture, Conflicts and
Harmony: A Study on East-Central Europe’ (1991) 12 Rechtstheorie Beiheft 321; M. Samu,
‘Culture and Law: Legal Culture’ (1991) 40 Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft.
77; as well as A. Sajo´, ‘Authoritarian Law’, in A. Sajo´ (ed.), Out and into Authoritarian Law
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002), pp. 1–22.
224. The term was introduced as a key term by Pierre Legrand.
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culture according to changing criteria in function of timely challenges and tradition
continued.
Thus, investigations for an ontology of law carried out within my researches
on George Luka´cs225 have already presented the prevailing lawyerly ideology as
an ontological component of the given legal reality, and the developments on the
paradigms of legal thinking226 have tried, at the level of analysis at least, to uncover
law from its dys-anthropomorphizing and depersonalizing formalistic envelope by
presenting it in its own complexity, involving its application, too, as a directly
social human product in the shaping of which both the entire society in general and
especially its lawyerly e´lite in particular (and, after all, every single addressee
actually contributing to the hermeneutic process of shaping the public
understanding of law) take part with full responsibility.
A possible and desirable research in this circle will above all contrast the
positions of legal positivism (classical comparative law) to the stand taken after
the disintegration of positivism (comparative legal cultures). Within such a con-
text, even the selection of either ‘legal culture’227 or ‘legal tradition’228 as a
key term will be a crucial issue, together with the dilemma of how far the hitherto
properly working genealogical category of ‘legal family’ remains (or may remain)
an operative concept in future development with growing unification and global-
ization as future trends.
This will presumably involve the assumption of definite attitudes in extremely
topical debates (forecasting developmental tendencies) such as, e.g., the conver-
gence between civil law and common law within the European Union (as a
prerequisite to a genuine unification or, at least, an important stepping stone in
advance); the codification of the law common for the European Union (especially
as to its means, methods and techniques for judicial actualization); as well as the
description of the process actually going on under the aegis of the interpretation
and application of the provisions of national legal orders in the jurisprudence of the
common judicial fora of the European Union. The last concern to be addressed in
this circle is globalism and its legal treatment, with particular attention to the effect
of its foreseeable developmental perspectives on the sustainability of the diversity
of legal cultures and ways of thinking having evolved so far mostly within national
bounds.
For what is just going on either within re-considerations after the European
Union’s completed and forthcoming enlargements or under the aegis of globaliza-
tion (and whose starting point, even if of a symbolic value, is the efforts at con-
stitution-making at the level of the Union, together with present-day failures) will
225. C. Varga, The Place of Law in Luka´cs’ World Concept (Akade´miai Kiado´, Budapest, 1985;
reprinted 1998).
226. Varga, Lectures (note 195) with preliminary papers (note 202).
227. E.g., C. Varga, ‘Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of Law’ (2005) 46 Acta
Juridica 177.
228. Most recently, e.g., J. Husa, ‘Emancipation or Deprivation for the European Legal Mind? The
Contribution of the Legal Tradition Approach’ (2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European
Law 81.
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presumably determine the fate of mankind for centuries. A clarification of the
mutual relations of such great trends is a task to be carried out by the profession,
along with meditation on the issue of what is referred to by scholarship as the
sustainability of diversity in law and legal traditions.229
All this may provide foundations for yet another topic of research, founded on
the dilemma raised once by Zweigert,230 who was the first, four decades ago, to
problematize on the chance of solutions identiques through voies diffe´rentes in law,
for the first sight involving an apparent paradox.
Well, exactly such is the direction already raised in international literature as a
potentiality one decade ago (highlighted by me, as it happens) under the name of
the ‘comparative judicial mind’, aiming at mutually contrasted comparative exam-
inations – firstly, through the accepted judicial ways of thinking and argumentation
(or, in English, canons); secondly, through legal techniques applied231 – of
the factors that may allow legal statements with similar conclusions to be drawn
from dissimilar laws, on the one hand, and assure (in most of them) the adaptation
to changing conditions at all times, by responding reliably and flexibly to new
challenges through a practical development of the law, on the other. At the same
time, this same examination may afford ontological reconstruction as well, expect-
ing to inform on the very nature of law: how and with what technical instruments
(in addition to the posited legal text) will the actors’ own professional values,
skills, conceptual sensitivity, paths, lawyerly ideology (etc.) contribute to the actu-
al shaping of the specific culture of the given legal order and its preservation and
renewal through changes of times.
Some research of a comparable scope took place nearly one century ago, in the
decades between the inquiries of Franc¸ois Ge´ny in France (around the turn of the
19th and 20th centuries) and of Jean Dabin in Belgium (between the two World
Wars), approaching law in an ontological perspective (describing the construction
of its proper existence) through a focus on conceptual patterns, transformations and
jumps – that is, techniques applied – in the actual process of its application.232
Present-day trends in hermeneutics, legal semantics and pragmatics (with language
taken as metaphor, as symbolism, as medium of post-Wittgensteinian speech-acts
in the background) all point to the promise and necessity of an examination of such
kind. However, up to now, nothing of the kind has taken place in the law. For it is
only the United Kingdom and some sporadic irradiations where attempts can at all
229. As of a landmark value, see H.P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 2000).
230. K. Zweigert, ‘Solutions identiques par des voies diffe´rentes (Quelques observations en
matie`res de droit compare´)’ (1966) XVIII Revue internationale de Droit compare´ 5.
231. Cf., e.g., C. Varga and J. Sza´jer, ‘Fiction’, ‘Pre´somption’ and ‘Technique juridique’, in
A.-J. Arnaud (ed.), Dictionnaire encyclope´dique de The´orie et de Sociologie du Droit (2e
e´d. corrige´e et augmente´e, Librairie Ge´ne´rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1993),
pp. 259–261, 470–472, and 605–607, respectively, as well as M. Maczonkay, ‘Pragmatic
Legal Reasoning and Its Antecedents in Roman Law’, in Hamza (ed.), above, pp. 169–186.
232. Cf., e.g., C. Varga, ‘Doctrine and Technique in Law’, in www.univie.ac.at/-RI/IRIS2004/
Arbeitspapierln/Publikationsfreigabe/Csaba_Phil/Csaba_Phil.doc.
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be encountered at offering explanations in terms of legal semiotics or as based on a
comparison of, e.g., English and German juristic methods.
In so far as we reflect such methodological insights onto the present facts of
the European Union and the conceivable perspectives of globalization taking
place, research should cover the effects of the law commonly codified by the
Union, its judicial and administrative application by the common fora of the
Union with repercussions on the chances of survival of the historical particularities
and relative autonomy (differing conceptuality, structure, problem-sensitivity,
technical store of instruments, as well as skills) of individual national legal
systems.
However, formulated from the opposite direction, all this is to raise the issue
whether or not, and in what sense and extent, the law of the European Union is
going to be (i.e., to become or to embody) some independent sui generis formation
or, otherwise speaking, how far its making, together with its administrative usage
and judicial application, will be a scene, medium and issue of competition of the
(above all) English, French and German internal (domestic) traditions (each of
them in a constant fight to expand their respective influences) for a genuinely inter-
national (i.e., EU-level) recognition. This is a complex issue in itself, with a
number a topics to be treated. Firstly, there is the issue of whether the parallelity
between the so far separate mentalities of continental civil law and Anglo-Saxon
common law will be preserved or they will rather intermingle with one another
eventually. Secondly, the patterns, techniques and chances of the common
European law’s codification. Thirdly, the patterns actually followed in the juris-
prudence of the common judicial fora of the European Community. And, in
general, the mapping of the legal traditions which make up the European
Union, with the description of their respective weighs and interrelationships as
well as of the chances of their survival despite their continuous transformation and
metabolism (with special regards to their respective sources of the law, concep-
tuality and techniques, as well as judicial methodology).
There is a particular stress on being sensitive enough while responding to the
concern of sustainability, that is, the prospects of an alternative between remaining
roughly the same in mutual interaction or assimilating incessantly to the rest (with
the issue of the pressure and/or predomination by certain actors) and of what role
some historically-evolved traditions may eventually play in forming this, by defin-
ing its basic directions and (besides adaptation) becoming a factor of stability and
strength at any time.
Reverting to the initial ideas, those issues that may need further elaboration in
the near future do include, primarily, the definition of the law’s identity and,
thereby, also of the criterion of juridicity by either the exclusivity of some
or the plurality of all its aspects and contexts (above all, whether the understanding
of law and juridicity is being reduced to some posited text or becomes dissolved in
the facts of legal practice, the so-called ‘judicial event’), and, arising from these,
also the explanation of the role law-applying may play in terms of either creative
responsibility or executory mechanicity, with the variety of factors in the making
and eventual shaping of the law, the relative autonomy of their paths, as well as,
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simultaneously, the doctrinal frames and relatively open chances of legal devel-
opment, with the significance attributed to the law in resolution of social conflicts
involved.
(4) Outlook II: The paradigmatic enigma of the transition to rule of law.
The seemingly temporary topicality of the problems indicated above233 is in the
last analysis also telling about the very existence and ultimate meaning and self-
233. For the related problems, see comprehensively, C. Varga, Transition to Rule of Law. On the
Democratic Transformation in Hungary (Philosophiae Iuris, Budapest, 1995); and, partially,
C. Varga, ‘Transformation to Rule of Law from No-law: Societal Contexture of the Demo-
cratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’ (1993) 8/2 Connecticut Journal of
International Law 2 487; C. Varga, ‘The Building up of a Rule of Law Structure on the
Ruins of a Regime Based upon the Denial of Law in Central Europe’, in L.E. Kotsiris
(ed.), Law at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (Sakkoulas, Thessaloniki, 1994),
pp. 219–239; C. Varga, ‘The Transformation of Legal Culture in the Central European Tran-
sition’, in Ra¨ttsliga kulturer och normativa strukturer Nordiskt Ra¨ttssociologiskt Forum,
25–27 augusti 1995 (Lund, 1995), pp. 1–18; C. Varga, ‘Constitutionalism, the Rule of Law,
and the Challenge of Transition’, in I. Grudzinska Gross (ed.), Constitutionalism & Politics
(Slovak Committee of the European Cultural Foundation, Bratislava, 1994), pp. 151–154; C.
Varga, ‘Local Legal Tradition in Question’, in V. Dvora´kova´ and E. Vora´cek (eds), The Legacy
of the Past (University of Economics Department of Political Science, Prague, 1994), pp. 315–
325; C. Varga, ‘Complexity of the Challenge Facing Central and Eastern Europe’, in Gessner,
Hoeland and Varga (eds), above, pp. 415–429; and C. Varga, ‘Nedelitel’ne´ pra´vo a pra´vna
s˘ta´tnost (1992) 75 Pra´vny obzor 92. See also P. Paczolay, ‘Constitutional Transition and Legal
Continuity’ (1993) 8/2 Connecticut Journal of International Law 559; A. Sajo´, ‘Legal Social-
ization in Hungary and the Transition from State Socialism’ (1994) 14 Comparative Social
Research 97; A. Sajo´, ‘The Limited Impact of Communist and Democratic Socio-legal Experi-
ences’ (2000) 41 Acta Juridica 119; and A. Sajo´, ‘Pluralism in Post-communist Law’ (2003) 44
Acta Juridica 1; as well as Z. Pe´teri (ed.), Legal Problems of Transition in Hungary: Hungarian
National Reports Submitted to the Fifteenth International Congress of Comparative Law
(Bristol, 26 July – 1 August 1998) (MTA Jogtudoma´nyi Inte´zete: Working Papers 11, Buda-
pest, 1998).
For the ideal of the rule of law, see in (1995) 26 Rechtstheorie 3: P. Paczolay,
‘Constitutional and Legal Change during the Transition from Socialism to Democracy in
Hungary’, in Krawietz, Samu and Szila´gyi (eds), above, pp. 265–290; M. Szabo´, ‘New Con-
stitutionalism Based on an Old Notion: The Rule of Law in the Mirror of the Decisions of the
Hungarian Constitutional Court’, in Krawietz, Samu and Szila´gyi (eds), above, pp. 291–303; P.
Szila´gyi, ‘Verfassungsstaatlichkeit und Vera¨nderung des Rechts in Ungarn’, in Krawietz,
Samu and Szila´gyi (eds), above, pp. 305–328; A. Tama´s, ‘Constitutionalism and Changing
Law’, in Krawietz, Samu and Szila´gyi (eds), above, pp. 329–338; and M. Samu, ‘Verwirkli-
chung der Volksmacht im Rechtsstaat’, in Krawietz, Samu and Szila´gyi (eds), above, pp. 349–
363; as well as M. Szabo´, ‘Transition into the Rule of Law: Deconstruction, Reconstruction,
Construction’, in Krawietz and Varga (eds), above, pp. 283–295; and P. Szila´gyi, ‘The System
of Sources of Law and the Rule of Law in the Flow of the Change of Regimes’, in Krawietz and
Varga (eds), above, pp. 397–410; also A. Sajo´, ‘New Legalism in East Central Europe: Law as
an Instrument of Social Transformation’ (1990) 17 Journal of Law and Society 329.; A. Sajo´,
‘Rule by Law in East-Central Europe: Is the Emperor’s New Suit a Straightjacket?’, in
D. Greenberg et al. (eds), Constitutionalism & Democracy. Transitions in the Contemporary
World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993), pp. 321–335; and A. Sajo´, ‘On Old and New
Battles: Obstacles to the Rule of Law in Eastern Europe’ (1995) 22 Journal of Law and Society
97; as well as M. Szabo´, ‘The ‘‘Rule of Law’’ and the ‘‘Socialist Legality’’’ (1994) 9 Publ.
Univ. Miskolc: Sectio juridica et politica 195.
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identity of law. It is to be remembered that dictatorships born in Europe and the Far
East between the two World Wars (with the regime of national socialism in the
lead) raised already somewhat similar questions. However, these last ones may
have arisen mostly from doctrinal interest. For the regimes concerned were either
terminated by war victory, only to be replaced by a new regime due to intervention
by the authorities of military occupation rather than to democracy only lately and
gradually superimposed (in Germany, Italy and Japan), or they expired in a peace-
fully old age, bearing their own democratic transcendence in themselves, nurtured
by a kind of underlying social concord (Spain, Portugal).
In contrast to instances from the inter-war period, the collapse of communism
took place everywhere in the region imbued with aspirations to a democratic rule of
law and with the determination for developing also its cultural medium – even if its
low intensity, counter-run by bygone habits and burdened with growing uncertainty
(especially intensified eastwards), resulted in the partial revival of centuries-old
local traditions (reactivating, in the east proper, also Byzantine and Mongolian
roots). All in all, from a lawyer’s perspective, this was not only the encounter of
value-negation (from the aspect of a democratic constitutional arrangement) with a
(new) value-assertion but this also amalgamated otherwise antagonistic positions,
in terms of which the democratic change of regimes was directly prepared by the
preceding dictatorial system while the new democratic attitude to the criminal past
also had to be defined partly by the former (dictatorial) system. Because the new
cannot raise itself out of nothing. Even if it has plenty of external patterns to draw
from, it has to define itself – its ethics, its initiatives and the latter’s ways and
boundaries – in relationship to its own predecessor. In the strain of the sine qua non
of judging the past while taking a stand between this age-old pair of opposites of
any western legal philosophizing, justice and legality, it cannot avoid the necessity
of deciding either for one of them or for a compromise of balancing in-between
them, which are mutually excluding in face value yet in fact complementary sides,
serving and thereby also reciprocally presupposing one another. For, as we know,
past law also had had a kind of positivity, on the one hand, while the transition from
it was required exactly by the affirmation of democratic values, inescapably
reclaiming for judging and condemning the same past, on the other. Then again,
we can see that inequitable, unfair, moreover, overtly unworkable responses can
and could be given to this complex intellectual and moral challenge, in so far as one
of those particular positions is absolutized (in a way unsuitable to verification,
because withstanding interpretability in a logic of problem-solving but solely
For its inter-relations to constitutionality, see A. Bragyova, ‘Constitutional Review and
Democracy’ (1999) 40 Acta Juridica 125, as well as M. Bo´dig, ‘Legislation and the Limits of
Law’, in Krawietz and Varga (eds), above, pp. 141–150; T. Gyo rfi, ‘The Constitutional Limits
of Legislative Power’, in Krawietz and Varga (eds), above, pp. 355–368; and F. Ho¨rcher, ‘The
Question of the Limitation of the State by the Law: A Comparison of Kelsen’s and Hayek’s
Approach’, in Krawietz and Varga (eds), above, pp. 369–380. For a critical assessment, cf., A.
Sajo´, ‘Universal Rights, Missionaries, Converts and ‘‘Local Savages’’’ (1997) 6 East
European Constitutional Review 44; and A. Sajo´, ‘Was macht der Westen falsch bei der
Unterstu¨tzung der Rechtsreformen in Osteuropa?’ (1997) Kritische Justiz 496.
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accepting it in a logic of demonstration, that is, in the very formal, artificially
constructed world of the law, where any conclusion and its opposite with a
variety of in-between compromise solutions can be upheld, if met – by chance –
by the final legal force). And this practical outcome of rejecting the very chance of
facing with the past in law hardly indicates anything else than (in want of
the above material comprehension) the one-sidedness of some inequitable blindness,
issuing from the primitive condition in which the question itself was in fact posed
polarizingly, to the exclusive alternative of taking a stand between some either/or.234
What follows as a symbolic message from all the above, from the necessary
failure of seeking merely formal solutions, is just the need for reconsidering law by
recognizing that its positivation cannot be more than a surface phenomenon exclu-
sively. It becomes conspicuous only in borderline situations (away from everyday
routine) that anyone positing it posits it based on definite value-choices. And such
value-choices refer back to society as to the source of everything societal, as to its
hermeneutical medium, and also as to the subject owing to whom the law gets
actualized and reactualized, conventionalized and reconventionalized. Obviously,
any agent is in principle free to deviate from values generally followed, moreover,
to effect an operation bound to failure. Any choice can indeed be done by free will.
The only option excluded is to claim to have been acting under some external
constraint. For, in the final analysis, the only thing the law has is its own formality,
that is, its being objectivated in/as a text. Accordingly, the law itself has no coer-
cive force either, as it does not assert itself through any mechanicity, with no
alternative offered. Or, this is to say that the agent is free to choose any solution
he finds conclusive (and can turn to be successful if there is no legal objection to it
and/or if the society’s legal institutionalization will not reject it), however, his
responsibility is as undivided as if he had taken any other choice. It usually
becomes clear in borderline situations that in respect of the requirements of the
law’s formal positivity, on the one hand, and the (final and instrumental) values to
be protected in and by the law, on the other, it is not strain or tension that is at stake
(and even less a case of contradiction) but – putting it briefly – the sensitive
relationship between goals and means.
234. Focussed on just one but crucial segment of the problem, cf., e.g., C. Varga (ed.), Coming to
Terms with the Past under the Rule of Law. The German and the Czech Models (Windsor Klub,
Budapest, 1994). As to details, A. Bragyova, ‘Legality and ex post facto Political Justice’ (1991)
32 Acta Juridica 179; and A. Bragyova, ‘Constitutional Law as Limit to Legal Change: The
Constitutional Court and the Backward-looking Laws in Hungary’, Paper presented at The Role
of Judicial Review Bodies in Countries in Transition (International Symposium, Nagoya Uni-
versity Centre for Asian Legal Exchange, 29–30 July, 2005), pp. 1–11; A. Sajo´ ‘Legal Con-
sequences of Past Collective Wrongdoing after Communism’ (2005) German Law Journal 425;
C. Varga, ‘Do We Have the Right to Judge the Past? Philosophy of Law Considerations for a
Period of Transition’ (1992) 23 Rechtstheorie 396; C. Varga, ‘The Dilemma of Enforcing the
Law’, in A. Aarnio et al. (eds), Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit. Festschrift fu¨r Werner
Krawietz zum 60. Geburtstag (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1993), pp. 427–435; A´. Zsidai,
‘Systemwandel und Beseitigung von Ungerechtigkeiten: Politik im Grenzbereich von Recht
und Moral’, in Krawietz, Samu and Szila´gyi (eds), above, pp. 493–506; and A´. Zsidai, ‘Minerva’s
Wingless Owl: Thoughts about the Transparency Investigation in Hungary and the Change of
Function of the Historical Office’, in Krawietz and Varga (eds), above, pp. 341–352.
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In such relationships, there may be goals in a merely instrumental role as
compared to ultimate material goals, but differentiations like this can only stratify
the instrumental side.235 Consequently, call-words (ideals and values) of our
culture, homogenized under the aegis of law in everyday social heterogeneity,
like democratism, human rights, constitutionality, or legality – well, all these
are to be interpreted within such a framework, even if some of them are placed
at the highest level(s); otherwise speaking, even if they seem to be ultimate goals
viewed from lower levels of institutionalization, while they obviously cannot claim
to have anything more than the role of serving (viewed from the aspect of the
ultimate material goals to be achieved). Henceforth, their suitability in their con-
crete actuality can quite well be questioned and alternative solutions and new
balances within their circles can equally be searched for.236
Or, by summing all this up,237 we can tell scarcely more: No matter
how carefully we tend and protect the treasure we used to be deprived of during
the imposed regime of socialism, that is, the prestige of law, after all we have to
realize that all this – together with our own legal culture in general – is only destined
for man. It must not serve itself and must not turn into anti-human fetishization either.
Nevertheless, the above claim does involve its reverse as well, because the
very fact of presenting ultimate values in the context of goals and means raises
necessarily the theoretical dilemma of whether or not our ideals are universal
indeed or depend on the here and now at any time, which, historically speaking,
can only be particular and concrete.238 All the issue is now further coloured by the
phenomenon of globalism, obviously insisting on the ways and means of the
universal expansion of the American pattern of democracy (complemented to
by the ideology of human rights and the rights language) to be widely accepted.239
Evidently, this is the key issue of the overall legal transfers. For the ever growing
235. Cf., e.g., C. Varga, ‘Buts et moyens en droit’, in A. Loiodice and M. Vari (eds), Giovanni Paolo
II. Le vie della giustizia: Itinerari per il terzo millennio (Omaggio dei giuristi a Sua Santita` nel
XXV anno di pontificato) (Bardi Editore – Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Roma, 2003), pp. 71–75;
and C. Varga, ‘Goals and Means in Law’ in (2005) Jurisprudencija (Vilnius) No. 68(60),
5–10, and <http://www.thomasinternational.org/–projects/step/conferences/20050712Bp/
varga1.htm>; as well as C. Varga, ‘Law, Ethics, Economy: Independent Paths or Shared
Ways?’ <http://www.thomasinternational.org/projects/step/conferences/20050920barcelona/
varga1.htm>
236. Cf., e.g., C. Varga ‘Rule of Law – At the Crossroads of Challenges’ (2005) I Iustum, Aequum,
Salutare 73.
237. C. Varga, ‘Rule of Law between the Scylla of Imported Patterns and the Charybdis of Actual
Realisations (The Experience of Lithuania)’ (2005) 46 Acta Juridica 1; C. Varga, ‘Transition
to Rule of Law: A Philosophical Assessment of Challenges and Realisations in a Historico-
comparative Perspective’, in Sadakata (ed.), above, pp. 185–214; and C. Varga, ‘Legal Reno-
vation through Constitutional Judiciary?’, Sadakata (ed.), ibid. pp. 287–312.
238. In its first formulation, cf., e.g., C. Varga, ‘Le droit en tant qu’histoire’, in Lukic (ed.), above,
pp. 13–24.
239. E.g., A. Sajo´ (ed.), Western Rights? Post-communist Application (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague, 1996); and A. Sajo´ (ed.), Human Rights with Modesty: The Problem of Univers-
alism (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004).
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catalogue of failures accompanying them worldwide240 seems to indicate
something of which even our legal sociology of the late socialist period was
quite aware. Notably, there are no entities in law reducible to mere formalities
as replaceable freely, at will. For all appearances notwithstanding, anything for-
malized in law is at the same time contextualized in the legal system, conditioned
by a given medium of interpretation, with meanings attributed to in the given
culture. And it is for this very reason that a purely technical term borrowed
from an external system can turn to be as alien and destructive in a medium
unfamiliar to it241 as an understanding and arrangement of democracy exported
into some differing historical context and cultural ideal of order.
(5) Incongruity in practice. The medium conditioning theoretical legal
thought is necessarily shaped by the field of studies in positive law that on their
turn dialogize with legal practice on a day-to-day basis. However, transition to the
rule of law, once having promised an easy victory in Hungary (to be fully achieve-
able through just reiterated magic formulas in theory and practice) has by now,
viewed from inside the European Union, become the subject of harsh external
criticism,242 as all we in Central Europe are being called to account for the
want of the paradigmatic change in legal practice that has been successfully imple-
mented in Western Europe since the Second World War, that is, for the lack of
shifts of emphasis from rules to principles, of the practical dissolution of the law’s
positivity – or, briefly, of all the developments whose recognition and also theo-
retical implementation with us are for the time being embryonic at the most.
For that what had once solidified as ideals for our ‘actually existing system of
socialism’ could hardly be more than a Russian vision on Western Europe, as seen
for instance by Lenin in his emigration (searching for its improvement by drawing
back to the Byzantine and Mongolian tradition of a well-centralized state) and
turned into brutal reality by Stalin’s regime.
All in all, although the official slogans of socialist legality and its theoretically
refined normativism discredited themselves for the Hungarian legal profession,
nevertheless these remained the very pattern which even the bravest actors of that
era dared only to criticize, that is – and all that notwithstanding – these were the
only ones available to provide a basis even for any re-organization or theoretical
renewal whatsoever.
So, that what had taken place in Western Europe following the Second World
War might be perceived by the contemporary legal profession (with its most
240. Cf., e.g., C. Varga, ‘Transfers of Law: A Conceptual Analysis’, in Sadakata (ed.), above,
pp. 21–41.
241. Cf., e.g., C. Varga, ‘Structures in Legal Systems: Artificiality, Relativity, and Interdependency
of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context’ (2002) 43 Acta Juridica 219;
and reproduced in O. More´teau and J. Vanderlinden (eds), La structure des syste`mes juridiques
(Collection des rapports, XVIe Congre`s de l’Acade´mie internationale de droit compare´,
Brisbane, 2002) (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003), pp. 291–300.
242. In a most powerful overview, cf., e.g., Z. Ku¨hn, ‘Worlds Apart: Western and Central European
Judicial Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement’ (2004) 52 American Journal of
Comparative Law 531.
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enlightened representatives included) here with a shudder at the most, even with
bewilderment and – despite the geographical proximity – only from a great and
unbridgeable distance (as symbolized by the Iron Curtain). Or, the role of princi-
ples, the fertilizing potential that can be drawn from general clauses, the strength of
definitions that can be developed out of the nature of things and, above all, the
underlying democratic and responsive human attitude could hardly accumulate
here to a full sense of professional culture in local minds.
The suspicion inspired by such absurd and at times expressly destructive
pernicious slogans as the ‘disintegration of imperialism’, the ‘escalating crisis
of legality’, the ‘legal uncertainty’ having allegedly become predominant in
Anglo-Saxon case law and statements on ‘the ruling class withdrawing its rule
itself’ (etc.), must have prevented any attempt to see clearly from becoming
besmirched. At the same time, what the regime of socialism imposed upon the
region as its adequate legal arrangement was hardly more than the European ideal
(by then already shaken and collapsed) of the early 20th century. Moreover, what
we are mostly just about to restore from our own past as memories of civic ideals is
exactly what was left behind (convincingly as its pre-history, that is, once and for
all) by Western Europe six decades ago, when it started to recommence after the
Second World War – independently of whether or not we are to remember it with
nostalgic esteem. So, our Western European and Atlantic companions in the EU
and NATO may have good reasons to realize that we, recently-joined full members
of the Union – Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary (etc.) – walk about at the fora
established in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Brussels in a rather strange attire, one
they may remember only from the times preceding their grandparents’ age.
(6) Perspectives. Our ways of cultivating law by erecting theories are rich in
approaches and views, trends and methods, and abound in debates and outcomes.
Hungarian legal theorizing is rather open to the outside world but is more receptive
in adopting Anglo-American patterns than duly reflecting on the developments of
either continental companions in the Union or the neighbouring Central and
Eastern European region.243 Thus, for example, it still fails to realize that
actual motions of the law both in the Union244 and as covered by globalization
243. The overly significant role played in science organization by the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences and its Institute for Legal Studies during socialism may have fulfilled functions
that can scarcely be exploited now in a democracy arising from the diffuse eventualities of
spontaneity. For these could once include an established framework for practical education
preparing for scientific research, extensive and systematic legal bibliographizing, profound
and regular critical reviewing of domestic and foreign legal literature, presentation of
Hungarian legal scholarship abroad with a comprehensive international academic
co-operation, regarding which the network of contacts and partnerships in our neighbourhood
and wider region as well was almost perfect and smoothly working. Nevertheless, compared to
the level of international integration at the time, even our Western European and Atlantic
presence might have been more powerful than today, in the epoch of globalization, when
international representation unorganized is almost equalling to national interests relinquished.
244. E.g., as preliminary studies, M. Szabo´, ‘Tradition of a Common European Legal Culture’, in
Cipkar (ed.), above, pp. 192–195; C. Varga, ‘European Integration and the Uniqueness of
National Legal Cultures’, in B. de Witte and C. Forder (eds), The Common Law of Europe and
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trends245 do have and need to have own particular legal theories. It also fails to
realize that from now on our foreseeable future depends less on merely own will
than on the balanced encounter of our domestic law and legal vision with their
European surroundings.246 The future of legal positivism (with our image of the
law’s self-identity included) depends on the relative strength of trends prevailing
within the Union and on our ability to influence them. Or, the genuine place our
law, jurisprudence and theoretical legal thought may occupy under the sun, will
henceforth be determined by our actual performance in the Union. And, in a Union-
level co-operation, the issue of who will have proven to be great or small will
exclusively depend on their respective ability to exert a pressure in or a decisive
effect on a game, in which all players have mostly equal access proving their
conclusive force.
Or, there is an elementary interest in developing theory, the more so because
what will eventually certainly remain is the human factor with the chance of
mastering the law by developing deeper insights and more responsive commitment
to values that may inspire man to make the most out of the instruments at his
disposal.
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